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Pandemics and the Protection of Privacy and Personal Information:
Issues with Regard to the Use and Protection of Information on the
Basis of Improving Public Health in the Fight Against Infectious
Diseases
Fumio Shimpo ※
Abstract
In order to make use of the response to the new the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) for pandemic
countermeasures due to infectious diseases that may have a serious impact on the lives and health of
the people, which may occur in the future, the handling of personal information and the protection of
privacy necessary to ensure the effectiveness of countermeasures against infectious diseases will be
examined. This paper intends to establish to comprehensively understand the systems for the collection
and publication of information related to infectious diseases based on the Infectious Diseases Control
Law, and to clarify the structure and issues of the current systems and mechanisms for the collection and
management of information on infected persons.
Keywords: Pandemics, COVID-19, Privacy, Personal Information, Data Protection, Public Health

I The Impact of a Pandemic
1 Introduction
Infectious disease countermeasures include ‘Class I Infectious Diseases’ (Article 6, Paragraph 2
of the Infectious Diseases Control Law) and ‘New Infectious Diseases’, the latter of which refers to
unknown infectious diseases that are serious and may have a severe impact on people’s lives and health.
In response to both Article 6 (9) of the Act and the Public Health Emergency of International Concerns
(PHEIC i), a variety of studies that assume the occurrence of a pandemic ii have been conducted over the
years. However, analysing the response to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) clearly reveals that the
current studies and systems are incapable of adequately managing pandemics. To succeed in the future,
we should employ all that we have learned about the issues and experiences of dealing with COVID-19
so that we will be able to adequately manage a pandemic caused by a pathogen equivalent to a Class I
infectious disease.
Moreover, as pandemics are not limited to natural and spontaneous disease outbreaks, we need
to be prepared for anthropogenic or targeted threats. Viruses and pathogens have the potential to
be used as biological weapons iii, and these could cause Class I infectious diseases. Faced with the
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threat of bioterrorism, it is necessar y to consider not only natural phenomena but also ‘biohazard
countermeasures’ due to these human factors.
To ensure the effectiveness of reactions to infectious disease outbreaks, this paper establishes and
organises the essential issues in determining countermeasures against a future pandemic that could have
a significant impact on human life and health. In particular, likely countermeasures raise issues related
to handling personal information and protecting privacy. Therefore, this study will consider the subject of
pandemic response measures from the viewpoint of privacy protection and information handling.
2 What Is a Pandemic?
According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) Principles of Epidemiology
in Public Health Practice, iv the epidemic level of infectious diseases is divided into the following three
stages: ① endemic, (hyper-endemic if the incidence of infectious diseases is high); ② epidemic, (outbreak
if it occurs in a limited area); and ③ pandemic. In addition, conditions in which the degree of occurrence
is rare or irregular are defined as sporadic, and the aggregate of cases is defined as a cluster.
Table 1. Epidemic Level of Infectious Diseases v
Endemic
Recurring epidemics of infectious diseases in populations within a particular geographic area, or the
constant presence of infectious pathogens.
Hyperendemic
Outbreaks of infectious disease at persistent high levels in a particular geographic area or population.
Epidemic
Occurrences of more cases of infectious diseases than would normally be expected in a particular area or
population.
Outbreak
Epidemic types of disease occurrences, but it 'occurs in a limited geographical area' or 'is less likely to
cause public panic.'
Pandemic
Situation in which an epidemic has spread to multiple countries and continents, usually affecting a large
number of people.
Sporadic
Infectious disease occurring in rare and irregular situations.
Cluster
Disease occurring in a collection of cases grouped by time and place, in higher than expected numbers.

Source: Kunio Yano: ‘ Terms related to ’Epidemic’, Kenei IC News No. 71 (November 2017)
COVID-19 was declared a pandemic on March 11 th , 2020, at a meeting of the World Health
Organization (WHO) vi headed by Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, the Secretary-General. Previously, in
June 2009, WHO had declared the outbreak of new influenza A / H1N1 had become a pandemic. In its
‘Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response’ vii pamphlet, WHO first provided its definition of the
pandemic phase in April 2009.
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Table 2. WHO Pandemic Influenza Phases, 2009 Edition
Phase 1: There are no reports of a virus that is circulating in animals causing infection in humans.
Phase 2: Animal influenza viruses, or Influenza A viruses (IAV), circulating among domestic or wild animals, are
known to have caused infection in humans and are considered to be a potential pandemic threat.
Phase 3: IAV or human-animal Influenza reassortant virus has caused sporadic cases or small clusters of cases in
humans, but these viruses have not caused human-to-human transmission sufficient to sustain an outbreak at the
community level.
Phase 4: Human-to-human transmission of an animal virus or human Influenza-animal Influenza reassortant virus,
capable of causing a ‘community-level outbreak’, has been confirmed.
Phase 5: Spread of human-to-human transmission of the virus in at least two countries within one WHO region
has occurred.
Phase 6 (Pandemic Phase): In addition to the criteria defined in Phase 5, an outbreak has occurred at the
community level in at least one other country in a different WHO region.
Post-Peak Pandemic: Pandemic activity appears to be declining, but it is uncertain whether another epidemic
wave will occur, and countries need to prepare for a second wave.
Post-Pandemic: The prevalence of influenza disease returns to the levels normally seen with seasonal influenza.

Notes: Changes to the Government Action Plan for Pandemic Influenza due to the WHO’s revision of the
pandemic phase of the new strain of influenza, Office for Promotion of New Influenza Countermeasures,
Tuberculosis and Infectious Diseases Division, Health Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare). viii
Figure 1: WHO classification of the first pandemic stage (2009)

Source: World Health Organization, Pandemic influenza preparedness and response - WHO guidance
document (2009), p. 24.
Subsequently, the Pandemic Influenza Risk Management - WHO Interim Guidance, published in 2013,
changed the epidemic classification from nine levels in 2009 to four levels.
Table 3. WHO Pandemic Influenza Phases (2013 edition)
Interpandemic Phase: stage between pandemics and pandemics due to pandemic influenza
Alert Phase: stages where new subtypes of influenza have been confirmed to infect people
Pandemic Phase: global spread of new subtypes of influenza
Transition Phase: The stage at which global risks are reduced, and global responses may be gradually
reduced, or measures taken by each country may be reduced.
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Note: Changes to the Government Action Plan for Pandemic Influenza due to WHO’s revision of the
pandemic phase of the new strain of influenza (Office for Promotion of New Influenza Countermeasures,
Tuberculosis and Infectious Diseases Division, Health Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare).
Figure 2: WHO Classification of Pandemic Stages, (2013)

Figure 2: WHO Classification of Pandemic Stages, (2013)

Source: World Health Organization, Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response - WHO Guidance
Document - (2009), p. 7.
Subsequently, in May 2017, the latest version of the WHO guidelines ix was published. It is still in use
as a guideline for countries to understand the average global prevalence of novel influenza viruses. In
Japan, WHO has since revised the pandemic phase of the H1N1 influenza pandemic, and the ‘Government
Action Plan for Pandemic Influenza’ was revised. x
3 The Challenge to Personal Freedom
A pandemic of a Class I or similar new infectious disease would have a significant impact on the
protection of human rights and interests. It would challenge the ideas that have been held to be important
and noble for humanity, such as respect for fundamental human rights, democracy, and the development
of capitalism. How will we be able to maintain these values in the event of such a pandemic? The
impact of a Class I virus pandemic would be so great as to raise doubts as to our ability to take effective
measures for protecting our lives and health while respecting these principles. Another cause of concern
involves the impact of restrictions on individuals’ rights and interests and on their social activities that
are necessary to combat infectious diseases caused by the spread of new coronavirus infections in other
countries.
In fact, the introduction of surveillance measures to prevent the spread of infection, which comes
along with their implicit enforcement of homogeneity, and the restriction of individual rights and social
interests, together seem to be the most effective way to fight pandemics. In the face of pandemic
threats, the arguments that have been developed in terms of respect for individual human rights and the
protection of rights and interests may not be valid.
The most effective measure in the pandemic response xi might involve implementation of quarantine
measures aimed at thorough viral containment, along with the implementation of restrictions on
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behaviour, including freedom of movement. If so, does this mean that a pandemic response would be
better served by a political system that is able to restrict human rights without hesitation?
II Pandemics and the Legal System
Public health laws and infectious disease control regulations consist of various laws and regulations in
the fields of sanitary law and medical law, but this paper will only review the relevant laws and regulations
from the viewpoint of their applicability to ’pandemic control’.
1 The Infectious Diseases Act
The Act on the Prevention of Infectious Diseases and Medical Care for Patients with Infectious
Diseases (Act No. 114 of 1998) (hereafter referred to as the ‘Infectious Diseases Act’), covers all
infectious diseases. xii
According to Article 6 of the Infectious Diseases Control Law, there are five categories of infectious
diseases: ‘Class I infectious diseases’, ‘Class V infectious diseases’, and eight ‘new influenza and other
infectious diseases’, ‘designated infectious diseases’, and ‘new infectious diseases’. Of these, viral
haemorrhagic fever (Ebola, Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever, South American Haemorrhagic Fever,
Marburg Disease, Lassa Fever), plague, and Smallpox are ‘Category 1 infectious diseases’.
When a diagnosis of viral haemorrhagic fever is confirmed, Article 15 of the Infectious Diseases
Act stipulates that an ‘active epidemiological investigation’ should be carried out (epidemiological
investigation and control of contacts). In this investigation, consideration should be given to protecting
the privacy and human rights of the patient and the patient’s contacts, as well as consideration of the
safety of the investigators conducting the investigation. From the perspective of public health measures,
it is desirable to obtain prior consent from the person concerned, including the patient himself/herself,
if information would need to be shared or published between the relevant institutions. In the event of
an emergency due to an outbreak of a Class I infectious disease xiii, emergency measures are to be
implemented in accordance with the ’Basic Guidelines for Health Crisis Management of the Ministry
of Health, Labour and Welfare’ and the ’Guidelines for Implementing Health Crisis Management of
Infectious Diseases’.
COVID-19 is defined as a ‘Designated Infectious Disease’ xiv as specified in Article 6, Paragraph 6,
Item 8 of the Infectious Diseases Law, in accordance with Article 1 of the ‘Cabinet Order on Designation
of New Coronavirus Infections as Designated Infectious Diseases’ (Cabinet Order No. 11, 28 January
2020), based on the provisions of Article 6, Paragraph 8, Article 7, Paragraph 1, and Article 66 of the
Infectious Diseases Law. This infectious disease is classified as a Category 2 infectious disease among
the five categories of infectious diseases.
2 Quarantine Law
Under the Quarantine Law (Law No. 201 of 1951), patients with Class I infectious diseases (including
pseudo-infectious patients) are classified as having quarantine infectious diseases and are subject
to measures such as questioning, examination, isolation, suspension, and disinfection xv. Under the
Infectious Diseases Control Law, patients are subject to hospitalisation measures and are transferred to
designated medical institutions for specific or Class I infectious diseases and treated in hospital rooms
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with infection prevention measures. However, the quarantine law does not stipulate isolation (except for
livestock).
Between 2014 and 2015, the Ebola haemorrhagic fever (Ebola virus disease) outbreak in West
Africa became the largest epidemic in history, posing a significant threat to people of the region and to
travellers. In fact, when travelling to Africa in December 2014 to attend the 36th International Conference
of Data Protection Privacy Commissioners (ICDPPC) in Mauritius, the author remembers feeling
palpable anxiety about the safety of travelling while reports increased about the spread of the disease. xvi
In response to that Ebola epidemic, the ‘Guide for Administrative Response to Viral Haemorrhagic
Fever’ (June 2016, Tuberculosis and Infectious Diseases Division, Ministr y of Health, Labour and
Welfare) (the second edition was published in June 2017) was developed in Japan (hereafter referred to
as the ‘Guide for Administrative Response’). The guide organises various notifications, administrative
communications, and manuals; moreover, it summarises the response policy as a basic technical
guideline that contributes to the public health response conducted by prefectures, etc. This guideline
was in place at the time when the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) issued an alert xvii
document on a pneumonia of unknown origin (subsequently, SARS-COV-2), which was confirmed to have
occurred on 12 December 2019.
Based on the above, the 'Basic Policy on the Publication of Information in the Event of a Category 1
Infectious Disease Outbreak in Japan' has been established.
3 Immunisation Law
By preventing infectious diseases and their spread, vaccination is an important measure to protect
people’s life and health, and the Vaccination Law (Law No. 68 of 1948) legally specifies the types of
infectious diseases for which vaccinations are to be given. Prevention guidelines have been established
for ’Specified Infectious Diseases’ xviii to work alongside standards for the prevention of infectious
diseases and medical care for patients with infectious diseases. xix
Routine medical examinations are regulated by the Industrial Safety and Health Act, the School Health
Act, the Tuberculosis Prevention Act, xx and other laws and regulations relating to disease prevention.
These laws are all relevant to 'preventing' pandemics, and ser ve, like vaccinations, as susceptibility
measures to prevent infection.
4 Act on Special Measures against Pandemic Influenza, etc.
The purpose of the Act on Special Measures against New Influenza (Act No. 31 of 2012, hereafter
referred to as the 'Special Measures Act') is to protect the lives and health of the people and to minimise
the harm to people’s lives and to the economy in the event of an outbreak of a highly pathogenic new
influenza or a similarly dangerous new infectious disease. The Special Measures Act designates the
responsibilities of the national government, local governments, designated public bodies, business
operators, etc. It denotes the measures to be taken in the event of an outbreak of new strains of influenza,
etc., and describes special measures such as emergency measures for new strains of influenza.
The Act on Special Measures against H1N1 Influenza was amended through a bill that was enacted
and promulgated on 13 March 2020 and came into effect on 14 March 2020. This partially amended the
Act on Special Measures against H1N1 Influenza (Cabinet Act No. 46 of 2020).
The law has been amended to cover new COVID-19 infections so that comprehensive measures
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can be taken against the risk of significant impact on people's lives, the economy, and society. To end
the epidemic of new coronavirus infections as quickly as possible, it is necessary to adopt thorough
measures.
In the amendment of the Special Measures Law, the definition of ‘New Strains of Influenza, etc.,’ that
are subject to the law was amended (related to Article 2) to add new strains of coronavirus infections
to the scope of the law, as a provisional measure. As a result, any new coronavirus infections can be
regarded as new strains of influenza, etc. Therefore, the Special Measures Law can be applied to such
infections, and the action plans for New Strains of Influenza, which had already been established by the
national, prefectural, and municipal governments can now be regarded as action plans for these infections
as well. In addition, it was decided that the action plans stipulated in the Special Measures Law should
also be regarded as action plans for the control of any new coronaviruses. Furthermore, as stipulated
in the Special Measures Law, the changes allow for the issuance of a ‘Declaration of Emergency’ for
coronavirus infections. In response to COVID-19, such a declaration of emergency was issued on 7 April
2020, based on Article 32, Paragraph 1 of the Special Measures Law (a declaration that a new type of
influenza or other emergency has occurred).
5 Law on Armed Attack Situations
The Act on Measures for the Protection of Citizens in Armed Attack Situations, etc., (Act No. 112 of
2004) has special provisions for the designation of infectious diseases, etc. (Article 121).
Infectious diseases covered by the Act may be designated as such when there is an outbreak or threat
of an outbreak of a previously known infectious disease in several conditions: following an armed attack;
when there is a risk that a pathogen may enter the country without quarantine; upon the recognition that
people’s life and health may be seriously affected unless all or part of the provisions of the law are applied

mutatis mutandis. Under such circumstances, a disease may be labelled a designated infectious disease.
In addition, the Act stipulates that it may be deemed necessar y to provide vaccinations for disease
prevention.
However, the Law on Armed Attack Situations only allows for the designation of an infectious disease
as an emergency measure in the event of an outbreak of an infectious disease or invasion of a pathogen
following an armed attack, and it does not allow such designation on the basis of laws and regulations
regarding infectious diseases. With regard to national emergencies, it is valuable to consider the
positive and negative aspects of employing a national emergency power (an emergency clause within the
Constitution) to take emergency measures in order to maintain the existence of the state in the event of a
crisis that cannot be managed by the peacetime governance system.
6 Act on Punishment of Organised Crimes and Control of Proceeds of Crime
In spite of the fact that pathogens are subject to regulations for strict storage, handling, and transport
procedures xxi, there remains a risk of robbery by terrorist groups.
The Act on the Punishment of Organised Crime and the Control of the Proceeds of Crime (Act No.
136 of 1999) forms the basis on which pathogens can be used in any bio-hazard responses to the use of
pathogens by terrorist groups, etc., to cause a pandemic. The Act contains provisions on planning for the
commission of serious crimes involving preparatory acts by terrorist groups and other organised crime
groups (Article 6-2).
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Under Article 67(1), (dissemination of a type of pathogen, etc.), Article 68(1) or (2), (importation
of a type of pathogen, etc.), Article 69(1), (possession, etc. of a type of pathogen, etc.), and Article
70 (importation of a type of pathogen, etc.) of the Infectious Diseases Act, terrorist groups and other
organised criminal gangs that share common purposes and associative relationships are punishable for
the planning and preparation of such crimes.
The thinking behind the legislation envisages that bioterrorism may well be carried out with the
aim of inciting social unrest by triggering an economic or financial crisis. The Act on the Promotion of
Administrative Reforms to Achieve a Simple and Efficient Government (Act No. 47 of 2006) provides a
rationale for dealing with the types of financial crises associated with pandemics (and indeed with other
crises). According to Article 4, Paragraph 1, Item 4, the ‘Policy and Financial Reforms’ of the ‘Priority
Areas and Basic Policies for Reforms in Each Priority Area, etc’., under Purpose and Basic Policies,
(Objective and Basic Policy), the Government shall establish a system to enable new policy financial
institutions and other financial institutions to swiftly and smoothly provide the finance necessary to cope
with disruptions to financial order at home and abroad or damage caused by major disasters, terrorism,
or infectious diseases. Although the provision envisages a financial crisis caused by infectious disease, it
is not clear whether the provision would contribute to dealing with biohazards.
III Standards for the Collection and Publication of Infectious Disease-Related Information
1 Surveillance of Infectious Disease Outbreaks
The collection of information related to infectious diseases started in July 1981 as the ‘Survey of
Outbreaks of Infectious Diseases’, covering 18 diseases. In January 1987, 27 diseases were included in
the computer-based online system. In September 1998, the Infectious Diseases Act was enacted, and it
came into force in April 1999. As a result, a survey on outbreaks of infectious diseases was conducted in
accordance with the Implementation of the Survey on the Outbreaks of Infectious Diseases. This in turn
was conducted pursuant to the Enforcement of the Law concerning the Prevention of Infectious Diseases
and Medical Care for Patients with Infectious Diseases (Health and Medical Services Announcement No.
458, 19 March 1999).
Table 4. Procedures for collecting infectious disease-related information for the surveillance of infectious
diseases outbreaks.
Obligation of physicians to notify: Ar ticle 12 of Infectious Diseases (identification of all cases)
Notification from doctors to the Prefectural Governor
Obligation of veterinarians to notify: Article 13(identification of all infectious diseases of animal origin)
Notification by veterinarians to Prefectural Governors
Comprehension of the situation and trends of infectious disease outbreaks: Article 14 (fixed-point
monitoring)
The Prefectural Governor, with the consent of the establishment, designates a specific notifying body,
the administrator of which notifies the Prefectural Governor.
Investigation of the status, trends and causes of infectious disease outbreaks: Ar ticle 15 (active
epidemiological investigation)
An investigation serves to clarify the situation, trends, and causes of the infectious disease outbreak.
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Structurally, the notification system regarding infectious diseases may be divided into the following
categories: (1) total reporting, in which notification of all information on medical institutions and patients
is mandator y; and (2) fixed-point reporting, in which notification comes from designated medical
institutions. For example, in the case of viral haemorrhagic fevers among the first category of infectious
diseases (including pseudo-patients), such as Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever, there is an obligation to report
the case immediately to the nearest public health centre (followed by notification to the Prefectural
Governor) in order to ascertain the total number of cases. These requirements are based on the ‘Response
to a Possible Domestic Outbreak of Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever’ (Kenkan Hassan 1002 No 1, 2 October
2015).
In accordance with Article 15 of the Infectious Diseases Act, one is required to respond to questions
and investigations (i.e., active epidemiological investigations) if one is in possession of information
regarding any of the following: patients with infectious diseases, ‘pseudo-patients’ with asymptomatic
pathogens, or evidence of new infectious diseases. One is also required to respond if one is in possession
of animals that might transmit infectious diseases to humans.
2 Notification and Measures under the Infectious Diseases Act
In accordance with Article 12.1 of the Infectious Diseases Act, doctors who diagnose a patient with an
infectious disease are obliged to notify them xxii. Specific notification criteria have been defined for each
infectious disease.
In addition, as stipulated in Article 2.1 of the Quarantine Law, procedures are possible when a
quarantinable infectious disease is identified: questioning, medical examination and inspection, isolation,
suspension, health monitoring, and disinfection of the patient. Those who are not subject to isolation and
suspension measures are nevertheless subject to possible health surveillance. Moreover, in accordance
with the provisions of Article 18-2 of the Quarantine Law, the Quarantine Officer requests a report or asks
questions about the patients’ temperatures and other health conditions within a certain period of time.
If a person who has not self-reported at the time of quarantine becomes ill with, for example, a
Categor y 1 infectious disease such as Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever after entering Japan and is found
at a medical institution, the response will be based on the ‘Basic Response by Medical Institutions in
anticipation of a Domestic Outbreak of Ebola Haemorrhagic Fever' (24 October 2014 Kenkan Hatsu No
1024-1).
With these notifications, the personal information is to be obtained by the doctor and included on
the notification form xxiii. This contains the basic information of the patient or the deceased, such as
name, sex, date of birth, age at diagnosis, occupation, address, location, and, in cases involving minors,
the name and address of the guardian. The following information is required: symptoms, method of
diagnosis, cause, origin, and locus of infection.
3 Health Centre Real-Time Information-Sharing System, (HER-SYS)
The COVID-19 infections were notified under the ‘Par tial Amendment of the Outline for the
Implementation of the Outbreak Trend Survey of Infectious Diseases’ xxiv (29 May 2020 Kankan issued
No 0529-2). Here, the relevant information, such as the contents of outbreak reports, were entered using
the ‘Health Centre Real-Time Information-Sharing System’ (hereafter referred to as ‘HER-SYS’) instead
of the conventional outbreak trend survey system.
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HER-SYS is characterised by its ability to electronically input information on patients infected with
new coronaviruses and to centrally manage this information. Additionally, it is a system that can be
shared among medical institutions, public health centres, prefectures, and other relevant parties. The
system is designed to cope with an increase in the number of patients and the diversification of their
locations, and it can employ wide-area coordination.
However, at the time of writing, some problems with HER-SYS have been pointed out, such as
insufficient analysis of the collected information and problems with its operation and use. For example,
the lack of proper collection and analysis of information may prevent the effectiveness of infectious
disease control. The information obtained under the Infectious Diseases Act is handled in accordance
with the Personal Information Protection Act for Administrative Organs. However, problems have been
reported regarding inappropriate collection and analysis of information, and concerns have been raised
citing problems with the appropriate handling and protection in the acquisition and management of the
retained personal information. In addition, doubts have been raised about the public health centres’
appropriate handling and sharing of information, to which the Personal Information Protection Ordinance
applies.
4 New Coronavirus Contact-Confirming Application (COCOA)
The new coronavirus contact-confirming application (COCOA: New Coronavirus Contact-Confirming
Application) is a so-called contact-tracing application xxv that uses the proximity communication function
of a smartphone to confirm and notify people regarding the possibility of contact with a person who has
tested positive for COVID-19 infection.
With regard to COCOA, the Personal Information Protection Commission has expressed the
opinion that, ‘although it is considered that there are many cases in which the information obtained by
the business operator involved in the application does not constitute personal information as defined
in the Personal Information Protection Law, even in such cases it may constitute personal information
depending on its relationship with other information held by the business operator concerned’ xxvi.
The ‘Positive’ Person's Processing Number’ and ‘Diagnostic Key’, obtained by the Ministr y of
Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW) are categorised as personal information under the Personal
Information Protection Act for Administrative Organs. However, regardless of whether the retained
personal information is handled in accordance with the Administrative Organs Personal Information
Protection Act, there is no mechanism for supervision by a third-party organisation such as the Personal
Information Protection Committee xxvii.
The ‘Privacy and Security Assessment and System Operation Considerations for the ‘Contact
Confirmation Application and Related System Specifications’ xxviii (26 May 2020) describes the approach
to the application of the Administrative Organs Personal Information Protection Act and the Personal
Information Act as well as the policy on privacy considerations. However, the content and direction
of the implementation of specific privacy impact assessments and security assessments cannot be
confirmed. The second part of this paper, the Privacy Section, which is available in the upcoming Journal

of Information Law and Technology, No.9, will discuss the institutional issues, social acceptability, and
means of promoting the protection of privacy.
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5 Basic Policy on the Publication of Information
The publication of information related to infectious diseases was carried out in accordance with
Article 16 of the Infectious Diseases Control Law. The National Institute of Infectious Diseases (NIDID)
publishes the Weekly Report on Infectious Disease Outbreaks, and the MHLW publishes on its website
information regarding the status of infectious diseases.
In publishing the information, ‘attention shall be paid to the protection of personal information’
(Infectious Diseases Law, Article 16, Paragraph 2) xxix. Based on this provision, the ‘Basic Policy for the
Time-Being concerning the Publication of Information in the Event of an Outbreak of a Class I Infectious
Disease in Japan’ (hereafter referred to as the ‘Basic Policy’) has been established by the Ministry of
Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), (hereafter referred to as the ‘Basic Policy’), was formulated by the
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare's ’Study Group on Class I Infectious Diseases’ (7th meeting) xxx
on 20 December 2019.
The objectives of the policy are based on the fact that ‘in order to prevent the spread of infectious
diseases and to minimise the impact of health risks caused by infectious diseases on individuals and
society, it is necessary to proactively publish information on the occurrence of infectious diseases’. The
policy states also that ‘with the publication of such information, attention should be paid to the protection
of personal information so as to avoid unfair discrimination and prejudice against infected persons’.
In response to the spread of COVID-19 infections, the MHLW has established the ‘Basic Policy on
the Publication of Information in the Event of an Outbreak of a Class I Infectious Disease in Japan’ xxxi
(the MHLW, Tuberculosis and Infectious Diseases Division, Health Bureau, dated 27 February 2020).
This policy serves as a guideline for the publication of information on infectious diseases other than
those designated as Class I under the Infectious Diseases Control Law (Class II infectious diseases, etc.),
including COVID-19 infections, with reference to the characteristics and severity of the disease.
In the event of an outbreak of viral haemorrhagic fever among the first categor y of infectious
diseases, prefectural and other officials are required to conduct active epidemiological sur veys and
report the sur vey results to the MHLW in accordance with the ‘Guidelines for Conducting Active
Epidemiological Surveys on Viral Haemorrhagic Fever - for Local Governments’ (National Institute of
Infectious Diseases, 10 June 2016). These guidelines are based on Article 15 of the Infectious Diseases
Control Law in order to collect ‘basic information on infectious diseases, as stipulated by the Basic Policy
and prevent the spread of secondary infection’.
Table 5. Basic current policy regarding the release of information in the event of an outbreak of a Class I
infectious disease in Japan (summary extract)
(1) Basic information on infectious diseases
As different infectious diseases have different characteristics, basic information on the relevant
infectious disease, such as the incubation period of the pathogen, the origin of infection, and the main
sources of infection, should be provided. By disseminating this information, individuals are able to take
appropriate action to prevent the spread of the infectious disease.
(2) Information relating to the history of contact with the source of infection
Information will be provided on the presumed area of infection of the infected person, whether or
not this person has had contact with the source of infection. The dissemination of this information will
contribute to alerting people travelling to the infected area.
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(3) Information on the behavioural history of the infected person
Information, such as the behavioural history of an infected person during the period, must be made
public to the extent necessary to prevent the spread of the infectious disease when there is a possibility
that the infected person may transmit the infectious disease to others. On the other hand, it is not required
to make public information on the behavioural history of any individual during periods when there is no
possibility of infecting others with the infectious disease, as this would not contribute to the prevention
of the spread of infectious diseases. The behavioural history of infected persons during the period when
they are likely to transmit the infectious disease to others should, however, be made public. Nevertheless,
in making this information public, consideration should be given to the social impact of publication, and
efforts should be made to provide careful explanations to prevent the spread of false information.

The MHLW’s Headquarters for the Promotion of Countermeasures to Combat New Coronavirus
Infections, ‘Publication of Information in the event of an Outbreak of New Coronavirus Infections’
(Supplement) xxxii (28 July 2020), states that in cases where it is not possible to ascertain who may have
come into contact with an infected person, the following information should be provided in order for
individuals to be able to take appropriate actions to prevent the spread of infectious diseases: ‘the names
of places where they come into contact with unspecified numbers of people’ and ‘the presence or absence
of actions or contacts which could infect others’ are to be made public.
The supplementary information is as follows:
(1) ‘The publication shall not require the consent of the persons concerned, including the publication
of the name of the place’;
(2) ‘Care should be taken to protect personal information to prevent unfair discrimination and
prejudice against infected persons’;
(3) ‘If the cause of the infection is considered to be the failure to take appropriate measures to
prevent infection, such as those listed in the guidelines prepared for each industry, the inadequate
measures should be made public (and therefore ignored), so that adequate measures can be
thoroughly implemented.’
Based on the information above, the 'Basic Policy' is also applied mutatis mutandis to the publication
of information on new coronavirus infections, which have been designated as infectious diseases.
Therefore, it is expected that information on pandemic outbreaks of infectious diseases other than Class I
infectious diseases will also be published based on the Basic Policy in the future.
The problem is that the basic policy merely states in the abstract that 'attention must be paid to
the protection of personal information'. Although there is a policy on the 'publication of information'
necessar y to prevent the spread of infection in the event of a pandemic, the specific procedures for
the protection of personal information and the protection of privacy can only be addressed in a timely
manner. As a result, the MHLW, local governments, and relevant ministries and agencies are forced to
make individual decisions on the actual release of information, including the content and scope of the
information.
6 The Publication and Non-Publication Information Based on the Basic Policy
‘Basic Policy on Disclosure of Information in the Event of an Outbreak of a Class I Infectious
Disease in Japan’ (Ministr y of Health, Labour and Welfare, Health Bureau, Tuberculosis Infectious
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Disease Division, 27 February 2020) was issued to indicate the classifications of information that is to be
published and that which is not to be published, based on the basic policy is shown. It is presented as the
‘Standards for Publication of Outbreaks of Class 1 Infectious Disease Patients’.
The criteria for publication and non-publication of patient information during outbreaks of Class I
infectious disease are classified into four categories: (1) basic information on infectious diseases (Basic
Policy 2(1)); (2) the Infected Persons Information Act (Basic Policy 1), (3) information related to the
history of contact with the source of infection (Basic Policy 2(2)); (4) the situation after consultation and
hospitalisation at medical institutions (Basic Policy 1); and (5) information on the behavioural history of
infected persons (Basic Policy 2(3)).
IV The Pandemics and the Protection of Personal Data
1 The Procedures for Processing Personal Data
For the purpose of surveillance of infectious disease outbreaks, the Infectious Diseases Act imposes a
notification obligation on physicians and veterinarians in the procedures for collecting information related
to infectious diseases (Articles 12 to 15 of the Act). In addition, Article 15 of the Act stipulates procedures
for collecting information, including personal data, in active epidemiological surveys.
With regard to the provisions on the protection of personal information, the following laws stipulate
the provisions focusing on the protection of personal information: Article 16-2 of this law (publication
of information); Article 44-2-2 of the law (publication of information on outbreaks of infectious diseases
such as new strains of influenza and measures to be taken); and Article 44-6-2 of the law (publication of
information on outbreaks of new infectious diseases and measures to be taken). Specifically, particular
attention is paid to the delegation of personal information to a protection system. In light of these policies,
what must be taken into account in a personal data protection system?
If personal information is handled in the course of preventing the spread of infectious diseases,
it must be handled in accordance with the laws and regulations relating to the protection of personal
information.
The obligations of business operators handling personal information are set forth in the Act on
the Protection of Personal Information (Act No. 57 of 2003) (hereafter referred to as the ‘Personal
Information Act’). Furthermore, the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative
Organs (Act No. 58 of 2003) (hereafter referred to as the ‘Act on the Protection of Personal Information
Held by Administrative Organs’), applies to administrative entities, and the ‘Act on the Protection of
Personal Information Held by Incorporated Administrative Agencies, etc.’ (Act No. 59 of 2003) (hereafter
referred to as the ‘Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Incorporated Administrative
Agencies, etc.’), applies to independent administrative agencies, etc. Local governments are not subject to
these laws, nor do these laws and regulations apply to local governments because each local government
enacts its own personal information protection ordinance.
In addition, personal information of dispatched workers is protected in accordance with the ‘Act
for Securing the Proper Operation of Worker Dispatching Undertakings and Protection of Dispatched
Workers’ (Act No. 88 of 1985) (hereafter referred to as the ‘Worker Dispatching Act’). When handling
infection-related information of dispatched workers at the client level, the information that can be
provided by the dispatching company to the client is limited to information on the dispatched workers’

026 Japanese Society and Culture No.4 (2022)

ability to perform their work, in addition to the matters to be notified to the client based on the Worker
Dispatching Act.
Physicians who are legally obligated to provide personal information (notification) related to
infectious disease countermeasures under the Infectious Diseases Control Law and the Quarantine Law,
etc., share at the same time the legal obligation to maintain confidentiality as stipulated by the Medical
Practitioners Law and other medical-related laws and regulations, and they have as well the obligation to
preserve documents (e.g. the obligation to preserve medical records).
For information on the handling of personal information in relation to countermeasures against new
coronavirus infections, please refer to the following information published by the Personal Information
Protection Committee as ‘Information related to novel coronavirus infections.
Table 6. Personal Information Protection Committee ‘Information related to new coronavirus infections’.
The Personal Information Protection Commission's approach to the use of contact tracing applications as
a countermeasure against COVID-19 infections (1 May 2020)
Handling of Personal Information Protection Law when personal information is shared between medical
institutions related to COVID-19 infections (April 28, 2020)
Handling of personal numbers in the case of telework, etc., at enterprises, etc., collected as
countermeasures against the COVID-19 infection (April 15, 2020)
Handling of personal data for the purpose of preventing the spread of COVID-19 infections (Updated: May
15, 2020)
To visitors to the personal information protection committee: request for responses to the spread of a new
coronavirus infection (2 April 2020)
(Reference) Efforts to protect personal data outside Japan in relation to countermeasures against novel
coronavirus infections (15 May 2020)
・ The situation in Europe with regard to the development of applications to combat novel coronavirus
infections.
・The data protection authorities in each country have expressed their views on the measures to be taken
against new coronavirus infections.

2 Issues of applicable laws and regulations in personal information protection legislation
Doctors who are obliged to report or provide personal information related to infectious diseases
based on the Infectious Diseases Law are divided into doctors at national (independent administrative)
institutions, public or private hospitals, or general practitioners. For this reason, the laws and regulations
that apply to the handling of personal information are different for each of them: for the Independent
Administrative Institution National Hospital Organization, the “Independent Act Personal Information
Act”; for private hospitals and general practitioners, the “Personal Information Act”; and for public
hospitals, the “Personal Information Protection Ordinance” of the municipality in which they are
established. Public health centres and municipal health centres xxxiii are organisations established by
local governments based on the Community Health Law (Law No. 84, 1 July 1994) and are therefore
subject to the Personal Information Protection Ordinance.
Furthermore, the content of the obligations relating to the procedures for handling information
related to infected persons differs depending on whether the organisation to which the infected person
belongs is a business operator handling personal information, an administrative body (national public
officer), or a local public body (local public officer).
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In accordance with the ‘Basic Guidelines for the Promotion of Community Health Measures’ (Ministry
of Health and Welfare Notification No. 374 of December 1, 1994), based on the provisions of Article 4,
Paragraph 1 of the Community Health Act, it is necessary to establish a health crisis management system
in the community at ordinary times so that prompt and appropriate crisis management can be carried out
for health crises that may occur in the community. However, data protection systems and policies are not
the same in the private and public sectors. However, the problem of inconsistencies between private and
public sector personal data protection systems may hinder the establishment of a rapid and appropriate
crisis management system in response to a pandemic.
In order to address this issue, a review is under way at the time of this study of the personal
information protection system, with the goal of determining how to consolidate and integrate the systems
for the protection of personal information pertaining to the private sector, administrative agencies,
independent administrative agencies, etc. Moreover, it concerns how the administrative processing
system should work, and therefore, the application of the public and private sectors in the personal
information protection legislation. The issue of legal inconsistency is not discussed. Previous research
has developed valuable information on the problems caused by inconsistencies in the application of laws
and regulations in the personal information protection system, including the problems caused by the
different personal information protection ordinances in local governments (see Takato Natsui and Fumio
Shinpo, Personal Information Protection Ordinances and Local Government Responsibilities, Gyosei,
2007).
In addition to ‘personal data’ and ‘retained personal data’ (as defined in the Personal Information
Law), the terms ‘retained personal information’ and ‘recorded information’ (as defined in the Act on
the Protection of Personal Information by the Independent Administrative Institution), and other terms
will be used in this paper as they are in the Act, regardless of any differences in definitions arising from
inconsistencies in the personal information protection system.
3 Applicability to personal information and personal information requiring consideration
As defined by the Personal Information Law, personal information and personal information requiring
consideration should be divided into two categories: primary personal information that is handled in the
course of infection control measures for infected persons, etc., and secondary personal information that is
used for such measures. The former category is referred to as “(1) Infected person-related information”
and the latter as “(2) Information related to infection prevention measures” for convenience.
The following conditions are included in regulations governing infected person-related information: a
patient with a Class I infectious disease; a patient with a Class II, Class III, or Class IV infectious disease;
or an asymptomatic pathogen carrier; a patient with a Class V infectious disease or an infectious disease
such as a new type of influenza specified by an Ordinance of the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare;
or a person suspected of having a new infectious disease as revealed by a doctor’s diagnosis. Such
information falls under the category of medical history xxxiv, which places it as personal information
requiring consideration specified by Article 2, paragraph 3 of the Personal Information Act and Article 2,
paragraph 4 of the Act on Personal Information of Independent Administrative Institutions.
On the other hand, persons in the following conditions are not patients with an infectious disease and
therefore do not fall under the category of personal information requiring consideration: people who have
been in close contact with a patient with an infectious disease, a patient with a pseudo-infectious disease
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of the first category, or a patient with a pseudo-infectious disease of the second category as specified by a
Cabinet Order.
Since the personal information relating to infected persons collected under the Infectious Diseases Act
is information obtained together with the name of the person concerned, all of the information contained
in those documents required in doctors’ notifications under the Act is personal information that can be
used to identify a specific individual. For example, information regarding an individual’s travel routes is
required in the notification form for a Class I infectious disease. This includes such information as the
flight number or ship name of specific public transportation used. Although it is not personal information
in itself, it is nevertheless information that can be easily cross-checked with other information (it is not
easily cross-checked in the case of the Independent Administrative Institution Act) to identify a specific
individual. This information also constitutes personal information.
Table 7. Examples of ‘individuals’ whose personal information is collected
① Information related to infected persons
Infected persons themselves (positive persons), close contacts, and other contacts
Pseudo-patients and asymptomatic pathogen carriers (pseudo-patients and asymptomatic pathogen
carriers of Class I infectious diseases are treated as infected persons in the same way as patients with
Class I infectious diseases (Article 8 of the Infectious Diseases Control Law))
② Information related to infection prevention measures
Individuals whose personal information needs to be obtained for the purpose of infection control
measures (e.g., when personal information is required to be registered in order to control access to a
building for infection control measures)
Individuals pertaining to GPS location information and other information used for infection control
measures

Table 8. Examples of types of personal information collected
Personal information (as shown in Table 7): personal data and retained personal data, retained personal
information
Personal information requiring consideration (PCR positive test results)
Information relating to individuals: location information and other information necessar y for contact
verification
Personal information and personal information required to be obtained from third parties: e.g., in cases
where infection information of an employee's family is obtained

4 Procedures for acquisition of personal information requiring consideration
When acquiring personal information to prevent the spread of infectious diseases, or when acquiring
personal information requiring consideration, the business operator handling the personal information
must obtain the consent of the individual in advance (Article 17(2) of the Personal Information Act).
However, under the Personal Information Law of the Independent Administrative Institution,
the following cases may provide the justification when acquiring personal information requiring
consideration: (1) when required by law; (2) when necessary for the protection of an individual’s life,
body, or property; (3) when necessary for the improvement of public health or the promotion of the
sound growth of children; (4) in cooperation with public institutions; (5) for public information from
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public institutions; and (6) for externally apparent personal information of consideration (Article 17(2) of
the Personal Information Act).
Conversely, there are no procedures for the acquisition of personal information requiring
consideration. On the other hand, under the Act on Personal Information of Independent Administrative
Institutions, there is neither any procedure for acquiring personal information requiring consideration.
The only obligation is to enter the information in the personal information file register prepared in
accordance with Article 11 of the Act when the recorded information includes personal information that
requires consideration.
Table 9. Examples of persons or entities obtaining personal information requiring consideration
Organizations to which the person related to the infected person has connections (business operators
handling personal information and their business partners)
Organizations such as government agencies, local government implementing agencies and public health
centres, and medical institutions that take measures against infectious diseases;Doctors and other
healthcare professionals
Doctors and other healthcare professionals
Information providers (e.g., mobile communications providers) to cooperate in measures to combat
infectious diseases
Media organisations and academic research organisations

5 Protection of information of deceased persons (handling of information of deceased persons)
When publishing information on infected persons, ‘the same treatment should be applied to cases
where infection is discovered after death of a person suspected of infection with an infectious disease’,
according to the ‘Public Announcement of Information on Persons Suspected of Infection with New
Coronavirus Infections in the Event that Infection is Discovered after Death’ (Public Awareness) (Ministry
of Health, Labour and Welfare, Bureau of Health, Tuberculosis and Infectious Diseases Division, March 1,
2020).
The current Personal Information Act and the Act on Personal Information of the Independent
Administrative Institution aim to ensure the proper handling and protection of information relating to
living individuals. Personal data of deceased persons may be protected in a similar way as information
relating to a living individual is protected in relation to the bereaved family. On the other hand, in some
cases, the ordinance does not stipulate the requirement of viability. Such regulation is not intended to
protect the personal data of the deceased in the same way as those of living individuals, but it does so
only by not limiting the scope of personal data to living individuals.
For organisations that are subject to the Personal Information Act and the Act on the Protection
of Personal Information by the Independent Administrative Institution, the obligations relating to the
handling of personal information do not apply to the personal information of the deceased, except in cases
where the personal information of the deceased constitutes information relating to a living individual in
relation to the bereaved family. However, if there is no requirement of viability in the local government's
personal data protection ordinance, the ordinance applies to the personal data of the deceased. In
particular, the ordinance may stipulate the principle of collection by the deceased, which might make it
impossible to obtain the deceased's personal data. An example from the past concerns the ‘problem of the
missing elderly’, popularly known as the ‘non-existent elderly’. This is an example of a problem that arose
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as a result of not being able to obtain the personal information necessary to cancel a resident registration
from the bereaved family. Although the individual concerned was deceased according to the principle of
personal collection, the information nevertheless existed in public records such as family registers and
resident certificates.
While this is a controversial issue in terms of the protection of deceased persons' information, it is
also an issue that requires careful consideration of how it should be protected. The reason for this is
that it is not possible to extend to the deceased those procedures that are based on living individuals,
and such procedures would require the deceased to go through a procedure to obtain their consent. On
the other hand, problems have arisen in situations in which the handling of information that should be
treated within the confines of personal data protection has been otherwise restricted. This has occurred
in cases such as that of non-existent elderly persons, where information had to be handled about an
individual who was deceased but who is registered as still living. There are reasons why information of
living individuals and information of the deceased cannot be subjected to the same protection procedures,
such as the fact that extending the legally protected interest to privacy, which is an exclusive interest,
would have a significant impact on existing judicial precedents and procedures under existing legislation.
A previous study by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry found that over 60% of the bodies
of deceased people carry infectious diseases, and about 15% carry dangerous infectious diseases. xxxv To
prevent the outbreak and spread of infectious diseases, which is the purpose of the Infectious Diseases
Law, it is necessary to provide information on people who have died of infectious diseases to funeral
service providers who handle the bodies in order to inform them of the dangers. A survey conducted by
a study group of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry determined that such information sharing
is necessary to prevent the outbreak of infectious diseases and to prevent their spread, which is the
purpose of the Infectious Diseases Law.
As Article 30 of the Infectious Diseases Act stipulates movement restrictions, etc., for corpses with
infectious diseases such as Class I, Class II, Class III, or with new strains of influenza, information
on contamination by pathogens of infectious diseases is provided in accordance with the said article.
Since there are no restrictions on the handling of corpses with other infectious diseases, the Personal
Information Protection Ordinance may be used to determine that information on deceased persons who
have died of infectious diseases cannot be provided in relation to the confidentiality obligations of medical
personnel under the Medical Practitioners Act.
According to the interpretation of the Personal Information Act, information on deceased persons
is not personal information and can therefore be provided. Even in cases where the provision of
information, such as information on infectious diseases of the deceased, is assessed as falling under
the category of personal data of the bereaved, it is possible to interpret the law so that the information
can be provided without the consent of the bereaved, as regarding protection of the life and body of
the individual to whom the information is provided (e.g., the person in charge of the funeral service
who handles the body). However, this interpretation is not correct because, under the Personal Data
Protection Ordinance, information about the deceased must still be treated as personal data.
With regard to the handling of information on persons who have died from COVID-19 infection, their
information is handled by the business operator handling the corpse, crematorium workers, and other
related parties xxxvi in accordance with the guidelines on post-death care.
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6 Procedures for the use and provision of personal data and retained personal information
The purposes of using personal data and retaining personal information in infectious disease
control include the improvement of public health, infectious disease control, epidemiological research,
employment management, and occupational health and safety.
With regard to the provision of personal data to third parties and the provision of retained personal
information, it is necessar y to distinguish between the literal ‘provision’ of personal data and the
‘publication’ (publication to an unspecified number of people) for the purpose of infectious disease
control, as their purposes are very different.
Table 10. Examples of scope of use
Internal use within the handling organisation
Sharing within the organisation (including publication within the organisation)
Provision outside the organisation
Use falling under exemptions such as provision to public institutions or in accordance with laws and
regulations
Use or provision that does not fall under an exemption
Publication outside the organization handling the data

Table 11. Examples of cases not applicable to provision to third parties
Joint use, business succession, consignment
Group companies for the purpose of infectious disease control (joint use)
The infected person’s personal information requiring consideration is provided to the successor company
when that company succeeds to the business due to deterioration in management (business succession)
When information management is entrusted to a specialist in infectious disease control to receive advice
on infection control measures within the business (entrustment)

In principle, the consent of the individual is required for the provision of personal data and retained
personal information xxxvii. Furthermore, the Personal Information Act does not allow for the provision of
personal information requiring consideration on an opt-out basis.
The Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held by Administrative Organs of Japan does not
stipulate any restriction on the provision of personal information in need of consideration, but there is
no opt-out procedure in the Act. Thus, under both the Act on the Protection of Personal Information
Held by Administrative Organs of Japan and the Act on the Protection of Personal Information Held
by Administrative Organs of Japan, personal information in need of consideration cannot be provided
without the consent of the individual.
Personal information requiring consideration is provided in accordance with the Personal Information
Law to prevent the spread of infection under certain conditions: (1) when it is required by law; (2) when
it is necessary for the protection of human life, body, or property; (3) when it is particularly necessary
for the improvement of public health or the promotion of the sound growth of children; or (4) when it is
necessary for cooperation with public institutions. Article 23(1) of the Personal Information Act (each
item of Article 23-1 of the Personal Information Act).
When personal data are provided by a business operator handling personal information for the
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purpose of active epidemiological investigations (investigations into the status, trends, and causes of
infectious disease outbreaks as defined by Article 15 of the Infectious Diseases Law), the provision of
personal data falls under the provision based on laws and regulations.
In the case of administrative organs, independent administrative agencies, etc., both cases where
retained personal information is provided for the investigation under Article 15 of the Act and where it is
retained for the publication of infectious disease-related information under Article 16 of the Act are in the
category in which a person who receives retained personal information in accordance with Article 8(2)
(iii) of the Act on the Protection of Personal Information of Administrative Organs and Article 9(2)(iii) of
the Act on the Protection of Personal Information of Independent Administrative Agencies. These rules
pertain to uses of personal information relevant to the provision as necessary for the performance of the
affairs or business prescribed by law.
In cases where the person is unconscious and it is not possible to confirm the circumstances of the
infection or the identities of those in contact with the infected person himself/herself, the case falls under
the protection of human life and body. The term ‘person’ here includes not only the infected person but
also third parties. In such cases too, personal data can be provided without the consent of the person
concerned, since not only is it impossible to obtain his consent, but the opportunity for the contact to be
aware of this fact is also lost.
Table 12. Exemptions from the acquisition and use of ‘personal information’ and ‘personal information
requiring consideration’: provision of ‘personal data’ and related procedures
① It is required by law
② It is necessary for the protection of a person’s life, body, or property
③ It is especially necessary for the improvement of public health or the promotion of the sound growth of
children
④ Cooperation is needed with public institutions
⑤ Personal information requiring consideration is made public by a public institution
⑥ There is a case of consignment, business succession, or joint use of the handling of externally apparent
personal information requiring consideration or personal information requiring consideration (Article 7 of
the Enforcement Order)
⑦ There is a risk of harm to the rights or legitimate interests of the business operator handling the
personal information
⑧ The purpose of use is clear
⑨ There is a risk of significant hindrance to the proper execution of the business of the business operator
handling personal information
⑩ It would violate other laws and regulations

Table 13. Application of exemption provisions in Table 12
Restriction on purpose of use (Article 16(3)) ①②③④
Restriction on the acquisition of personal information requiring consideration (Article 17(2)) ①②③④⑤
⑥
Notification, etc., of the purpose of use (Article 18(4)) ②④
Restriction on provision to third parties (Article 23(1)) ①②③④
Exemptions ⑦ through ⑩ are exempted from the application in procedures pertaining to retained
personal data.
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7 Problems in the ‘Application’ of the Law's Exemption Provisions
Among the application exemptions provided by the Personal Information Law, (i) cases based on
laws and regulations, and (ii) cases where it is necessar y to protect the life, body, or property of a
person, the former requires legal amendment if it must be applied beyond the scope of the current law in
infectious disease control, and the latter presupposes exceptional emergencies such as the person being
unconscious.
On the other hand, with regard to (3) improvement of public health and (4) cooperation with public
authorities, the former must be judged between public interest and the protection of the rights and
interests of individuals in the fight against infectious diseases, while the latter must ‘deal with requests
from public authorities as appropriate’. As cooperation with public authorities is only ‘cooperation’, it is
necessary to consider emergency responses in normal times, including amendments to the law, in the
event that cooperation must be compelled in the event of non-compliance. In other words, it is possible to
consider in advance how cooperation with public authorities should be provided.
As a concrete example, at the request of administrative bodies (the Cabinet Secretariat, the
Ministr y of Internal Affairs and Communications, the Ministr y of Health, Labour and Welfare, and
the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry) xxxviii, platform operators, and mobile communication
carriers are requested to provide data that will contribute to the prevention of the spread of new
coronavirus infections. This is to verify the effectiveness of cluster measures and to enable the effective
implementation of measures to prevent the spread of infection. To enable effective implementation of
measures to prevent the spread of the new coronavirus infection, platform and mobile network operators
are requested to provide data to help prevent the spread of the COVID-19 infection (as of 31 March 2020).
Operators deal with this request as appropriate.
Until now, the use of GPS location information has been subject to the ‘Guidelines for the Protection
of Personal Information in the Telecommunications Business’ (Notification No. 152 of the Ministr y
of Internal Affairs and Communications in 2017, last revised in 2017). This entity stipulates location
information (related to Article 35) (Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Notification No. 152
of 2017, last revised in 2017, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Notification No. 297).
The ‘Study Group on the Handling of Location Information in Emergencies, etc.’, of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs and Communications, has examined the issue of the provision of location information
based on requests from public authorities, and it has established the acquisition of location information
at the request of investigative agencies (Article 35, paragraph 4 related xxxix), and it also established
the acquisition of location information at the request of rescue agencies (Article 35, paragraph 5).
Although the relevant guidelines include provisions corresponding to the exemption from the application
of the Personal Information Law for the purpose of improving public health, they do not specifically
provide requests from public authorities to respond to countermeasures against infectious diseases.
Furthermore, they state that ‘in consideration of the balance between social usefulness and the protection
of the secrecy or privacy of communications,’ telecommunications carriers will consider the balance
between social usefulness and the protection of communication secrets or privacy. Guidelines state
that it is appropriate for telecommunications carriers to take necessary measures to prevent unjustified
infringement of users' rights (related to Article 35.3).
The provision of GPS location information has been addressed in the guidelines, and, if detailed
collection of personal information is to be implemented for the purpose of combating Class I infectious
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diseases, such as provisions implemented in Korea xl, it should be considered in advance by amending
the law or amending the guidelines. However, if such a compulsor y system is to be put in place to
collect information from the perspective of protecting the public interest rather than individual privacy, a
prerequisite must be that it is subject to supervision by a third party, and it is therefore essential that the
legal system for handling personal information shift to one that is supervised by the Personal Information
Protection Commission. In fact, it is essential to move to a legal system in which the handling of personal
information is supervised by the Personal Information Protection Commission.
Based on the above analysis, it is possible to consider in advance the requirements and standards
necessary for countermeasures against infectious diseases that seriously affect the life and health of the
public with regard to (1) laws and regulations, (2) human life and body, and (4) cooperation with public
institutions for which it is difficult to set clear standards, (3) the case based on the improvement of public
health. Thus, the issue of the case remains, based on the improvement of public health for the collection
of information for effective countermeasures against infectious diseases.
8 Exemption from the obligations of business operators handling personal information
In accordance with Article 76 of the Personal Information Law, the obligations of business operators
handling personal information do not apply to institutions and organisations that handle personal
information for the purpose of providing it to the press, writing, and academic research xli.
On the other hand, there is no exemption provision in the Act on Personal Information of
Independent Administrative Institutions. This includes cases of research at national universities and
private universities, and it means the use of personal information at their respective hospitals, national
universities, and hospitals to which the Act applies are subject to the obligations of the Act, even for
academic research purposes. This should cause problems when handling retained personal information
in research related to infectious diseases.
9 Others
It is necessary to consider the provision of anonymized processed medical information based on the
Next-Generation Medical Care Infrastructure Act in cases of using information related to the infectedperson and information related to infection-control as pseudonym-processed information, anonymized
processed information (de-identified processed information), and statistical information. Moreover,
it is necessar y to consider the handling of infection-control-related information that is not personal
information at the provider but may be personal data at the recipient.
V Use of personal data on the basis of improving public health and its limitations
1 What is the improvement of public health?
While the Personal Information Act provides an exemption for the ‘improvement of public health’, the
Independent Administrative Institution Personal Information Act does not provide an exemption on the
basis of the improvement of public health.
As for ‘improvement of public health’, Article 25 of the Constitution of Japan states that ‘Every citizen
has the right to a healthy and cultured minimum standard of living. The State shall endeavour to improve
and promote social welfare, social security, and public health in all spheres of life’. The law clearly states
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that public health should be improved and promoted.
The basic principle of Article 1 of the Infectious Diseases Act is health: ‘The purpose of this Act is
to prevent the outbreak of infectious diseases and to prevent their spread, and thereby to improve and
promote public health by prescribing the necessary measures for the prevention of infectious diseases
and the medical treatment of patients with infectious diseases’ (Article 9). At the same time, Article 9 of
the same law requires the establishment of basic guidelines (basic policy) to comprehensively promote
the prevention of infectious diseases, and Article 2(9) of the same law stipulates ‘matters concerning the
enlightenment and dissemination of knowledge on infectious diseases and respect for the human rights
of patients with infectious diseases’.
Various cases have been raised concerning public health and the violation of human rights and
legal interests. For example, there have been disease-related cases such as the isolation of leprosy
patients in sanatoriums based on the Leprosy Prevention Law, pollution-caused diseases creating
health hazards, vaccination disasters that trigger lawsuits, and lawsuits against effects of medicines.
In relation to environmental issues, there have been disputes over the violation of legal interests in the
living environment and public health caused by the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident
and environmental pollution caused by industrial waste. In other words, against the background of the
relationship between public health and the guarantee of human rights, there is a situation in which the
handling of personal information, which may invade the privacy of individuals in matters relating to public
health, has to be restrained.
2 Exemption provisions based on the improvement of public health
In the event of a pandemic that may seriously affect public life and health, the question that needs
to be considered is to what extent personal information must be used beyond the scope necessary to
achieve its specified purpose to prevent the spread of an infectious disease, or to what extent such use is
permissible on the basis of ‘improvement of public health’ when a situation arises that must be dealt with,
including ‘publication of personal information’ (provision of personal data).
The structure of an exemption on the basis of ‘improvement of public health’ consists of ‘reasons
why the mandatory provision must be excluded’ and ‘difficulties in obtaining the consent of the person
concerned’. The use or publication of infectious disease-related information for purposes other than those
for which it was intended on the basis of ‘improvement of public health’ may be carried out in cases in
which it is impossible to obtain the consent of the individual for reasons that meet those requirements.
However, there is no basis under the current law to restrict the ‘scope and content of use and publication’
in such cases.
When personal information relating to infected persons is obtained in accordance with the Infectious
Diseases Control Law, through procedures based on laws and regulations, there is no obligation to obtain
the consent of the individual in relation to the acquisition of personal information requiring consideration
at the time of acquisition. When such information is provided in accordance with laws and regulations,
it can be made public without obtaining the consent of the individual. In other words, in the personal
information protection system, the publication of real names that can identify specific individuals does
not constitute illegal handling of personal information in light of the procedures for interpreting the law.
The personal data protection system sets out procedures for obtaining the consent of the individual
for the acquisition and provision of personal data, but it does not place any restrictions on the content

036 Japanese Society and Culture No.4 (2022)

of the information to be acquired or the information to be provided. Indeed, the obligation to check the
records when providing information to a third party also only imposes an obligation to check. In other
words, there are no restrictions on the information to be obtained or provided in procedures where it is
not required to obtain the consent of the individual. Therefore, in the personal information protection
system, there is no restriction on the provision of personal information obtained under the Infectious
Diseases Act for the purpose of improving public health, and there is no legal problem in publishing the
information as it is obtained.
In light of the fact that Article 3 of the Personal Information Act states that ‘personal information
should be handled with care and respect for the individual's personality’, is it in fact accurate to argue
that personal data cannot be provided in a way that would damage the individual's personal interests?
As this provision is not an obligation of the business operator to handle personal information but a basic
principle of the law, the application of this provision is not obligatory in applying the exemptions provided
in the mandatory provisions.
Therefore, in terms of literary interpretation, there are two views. First, one view perceives that the
acquisition and provision of personal information can be carried out without any particular restriction
on the basis of the improvement of public health and due to the exemption provisions of the Act
(unlimited theory). Another perspective argues the acquisition of personal information and the provision
(publication) of personal data should not be allowed without restriction on the basis of the improvement
of public health from the viewpoint of guaranteeing the right to privacy of individuals (limited theory).
This problem cannot be solved under the current personal data protection system and needs to be
considered from the perspective of the protection of privacy, which is a personal interest of individuals.
As the right to privacy is constitutionally guaranteed, even if a public authority judges that the publication
of personal information is not problematic under the personal information protection system, it may still
constitute a disclosure of personal information that violates the right to privacy.
3 Limitations of the interpretation of the exemption for improving public health and the need to develop
a basis for decision-making
This divergence in interpretation raises concerns not only about the possibility of situations in which
personal data may be provided without restriction on the basis of the improvement of public health,
but it also raises concerns about the possibility that the collection and provision of information may be
hindered by privacy issues in the event of a serious public health emergency.
In addition, since there is no standard for what kind of information should be restricted, there is a risk
that the collection and provision of necessary information will be atrophied, and thus urgent measures
to prevent the spread of infection will not be taken. In an emergency situation, there is no time to lose in
deciding which interpretation should be adopted.
To avoid such a situation, exemptions on the basis of the improvement of public health should be
subject to statutory criteria that can be used to ensure the collection and provision of information in
emergency situations.
For example, in judging of the ‘severity of the disease’, the following situations should be considered:
(i) the fatality rate is high, (ii) the number of infected persons and patients is high, and (iii) the severity of
the disease is high. Moreover, in terms of the ‘prevalence of the infection’, the following situations should
be considered: (i) the persistence of exposure is recognised, (ii) susceptibility measures to prevent
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infection are not fully functional, and (iii) the situation exceeds the limits of the response capacity of
medical institutions, etc. By collecting and confirming information that can serve as indicators for various
types of decisions, conditions such as the ‘Triage Criteria for the Use of Information Related to Infection
Control’ will be formulated with reference to the Simple Triage and Rapid Treatment (START) legal
method used for triage decisions. Criteria will be based on the grounds of improving public health. Thus,
the criteria can be useful as a basis for judging the legality of the handling of information (acquisition,
use, provision, and publication).
This paper has shown a sample of observations on the issue of infectious disease control and the
protection of personal information, but there are issues that need to be considered in view of the
limitations of the interpretation of exemption provisions on the basis of the improvement of public health.
This includes whether personal information can be used appropriately for effective infectious disease
control in the event of a future pandemic that could seriously affect the life and health of the population.

Note: [This article was originally published in ‘Journal of Law and Information System, Vol.8, p.41-62
(2020) <https://doi.org/10.32235/alis.8.0_41>, and the above is the translated version.]
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